



**Zaire:
Shaba—How Vulnerable?** []

Shaba, Zaire's most vital economic region and the site of two major foreign-backed insurrections in the late 1970s, now appears tranquil, with no dissident group operating effectively in the region. []

[] Zairean Army units based in Shaba are undermanned and ill-equipped to cope with all but small and sporadic skirmishes. [] neighboring Angola is reactivating the long-dormant National Front for the Liberation of Zaire (FLNC), which may attempt to launch small-scale guerrilla operations into Shaba. Other dissidents based in eastern Shaba and neighboring Tanzania and Zambia lack the external support, manpower, and effective leadership necessary to challenge Mobutu's grip. []

The Domestic Scene

[] Shaba—which produces 80 percent of the country's mineral exports—is calm, despite an economic downturn, and there is no evidence of significant antigovernment organization. The Lunda tribe¹—which straddles the border with Angola and which formed the backbone of Moise Tshombe's separatist movement in the 1960s and the FLNC in the 1970s—now seems passive, and few, if any, members retain separatist sentiments. Although students and faculty in Shaba's principal city, Lubumbashi, occasionally have been critical of the Mobutu regime, they are too disorganized to mount an organized challenge and spark prolonged unrest. Despite the absence of antigovernment activity, however, [] Kinshasa provides only a limited level of goods and services to the region, and the central government's control is minimal in many parts. []

¹ The 400,000 Lundas are Shaba's second-largest tribe. For the most part, Lundas dislike Mobutu, but their leaders are [] weak [] and thus are politically impotent. []

The Threat From Angola

Relations between Angola and Zaire have been strained for more than a decade. Authorities in Luanda have long denounced the presence of the Union for the National Liberation of Angola (UNITA) in Zaire, while Kinshasa believes that Angola is at least harboring, and probably training and arming, Zairean dissidents. []

[] Zaire publicly denies it assists Angolan dissidents and, to appease Luanda, occasionally cracks down on UNITA's political activities. []

[] Mobutu [] privately maintains a close friendship with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and is sympathetic to the goals of the organization, [] This support almost certainly stems from Mobutu's staunch anti-Communist outlook; he has long believed that Zaire is surrounded by a "red belt" of hostile or potentially hostile regimes. UNITA is politically active in Shaba, with about 2,000 members and supporters—mainly nonmilitary personnel—

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Zairean dissidents in Angola have been quiescent since their earlier attempts to oust the Mobutu regime from Shaba. [] the FLNC, which invaded Shaba from Angola in 1977 and again in 1978, is incapable of launching a major offensive in the near term. [] the FLNC's membership—including women and

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children—probably stands at fewer than 2,500. In recent years many FLNC troops may have served—probably unwillingly—with the Angolan Army units fighting UNITA, rather than operating separately against Zaire. Moreover, the defections of key Lunda leaders—such as Nguza Karl-i-bond, once Mobutu's main critic but now Zaire's Ambassador to the United States—have also damaged FLNC's credibility in the Shaba region. [redacted]


Recently, however, there are reports that the Angolan government is seeking to regenerate FLNC, probably in part to pressure Mobutu to reduce his support for UNITA. [redacted]

FLNC can probably carry out small-scale military operations inside Zaire, and [redacted] plans to start a hit-and-run campaign in October. [redacted]

[redacted] a small number of FLNC—even poorly trained and equipped—could easily penetrate the porous border to launch limited attacks against isolated government and military posts. [redacted]

The Angolan Army may also take advantage of the porous border and increase its hot pursuit of UNITA guerrillas, especially if President dos Santos concludes that more pressure must be placed on Mobutu. [redacted]

Angolan units have occasionally chased UNITA troops across the border and rounded up Zaireans they mistakenly believed were Angolan guerrillas. For its part, Kinshasa concludes that the Angolan Army could easily destabilize the Shaba region. [redacted]



Copper mine in Kolwezi: Shaba appears tranquil at present. [redacted]

Dissidents in Tanzania and Zambia

Tanzania harbors several small Zairean dissident groups, including the Coalition of National Unity (CUN) and the Congolese Liberation Party (PLC). CUN, led by former FNLC President Mbumba, has some members who left FLNC and the Congolese National Movement Lamumba faction, but it has fallen into disarray in recent years. [redacted]

Military Capabilities


Zaire's Army, which was overwhelmed in both Shaba invasions, and required French, US, Moroccan, and Belgian assistance to retake key parts of the region, has improved its capabilities slightly in recent years.

[redacted] the Army performed fairly well during the raid by about 100 guerrillas on the border town of Moba in 1984, and, within 72 hours of the incursion, the General Staff organized and executed a counterattack. Despite plans to expand the size of its armed forces from 70,000 to 100,000 over the next several years to strengthen protection of its borders, [redacted] Zaire has developed no coherent military strategy to deal with attacks along the borders. [redacted]

Despite its longstanding aversion to Mobutu, Tanzania is unlikely to encourage Zairean dissident activity. [redacted]

Zambian-based FLNC troops also are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Shaba in the near term.

[redacted] even though Zambian President Kaunda is critical of Mobutu's southern African policies, and particularly his support for UNITA, he probably would not welcome instability in Shaba, which could easily spill over into Zambia's economically vital copper belt. [redacted]

Zaire's Air Force could provide limited support, but we doubt it would play a decisive role in any combat operations. The Air Force, based entirely in the capital, 

Outlook

While we see no evidence of any major threat to the overall security of Shaba at present, the low level of central government control in the region and the limited capabilities of the Army could allow for opposition organization and activities in the future. Even in the near term, Shaba remains Zaire's most vulnerable region and is a likely target for dissidents

backed by the Angolan government. FLNC, lacking the manpower and organization to mount a major attack similar to past Shaba invasions, could carry out hit-and-run operations and possibly small-scale guerrilla warfare. Small raids, for example, could further damage Zaire's already depressed economy by temporarily disrupting mining production in Kolwezi. The Angolan Army, for its part, may be tempted to increase its hot pursuit of UNITA guerrillas along the border and even attack a few Zairean military outposts as a warning to Mobutu to reduce his support for UNITA. Eastern Shaba, on the other hand, appears to be fairly secure, and neither Tanzania nor Zambia is likely to encourage Zairean dissidents to launch attacks 